

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0381

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0212

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FALL 1974 NEGOTIATING ISSUES:

MESSAGE #5: US AND ALLIED DECISIONS

NEEDED FOR FALL ROUND OF TALKS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: MESSAGE #4 IN THIS SERIES DESCRIBED THE TACTICAL COURSE RECOMMENDED BY THE DELEGATION FOR THE FALL 1974 ROUND OF THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MESSAGE REQUESTS US DECISIONS ON A NUMBER OF POINTS LEADING TO CORRESPONDING ALLIED DECISIONS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDED TACTICAL COURSE. THESE DECISIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MESSAGE #2 DESCRIBING THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS FLOWING FROM IT. END SUMMARY.

2. OUR BASIC ASSUMPTION (SEE MBFR VIENNA 0189) IS THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO MOVE RAPIDLY

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WHEN THEY RESUME ON SEPTEMBER 16 BECAUSE OF SOVIET

RELUCTANCE TO MOVE ON MBFR UNTIL THEY HAVE SEEN THE OUTCOME OF THE SECOND PHASE OF CSCE. WE CONSIDER THAT, NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES NEED TO GET RESULTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BY THE LATE SPRING OF 1975 AND THAT FOR THAT REASON THE ALLIES SHOULD IN THE FALL ROUND CONTINUE WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR POSITION, ADVANCING NEW POINTS TO THE EAST, BUT MAKING THESE CONDITIONAL ON LATER SOVIET COUNTERMOVES.

3. IT MAY EMERGE AFTER THE FIRST FEW INFORMAL MEETINGS IN THE FALL SESSION THAT THE ALLIES HAVE GOTTEN AS FAR AS THEY ARE LIKELY TO AT THAT TIME ON THE QUESTION OF "WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET," AND THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE AT THAT POINT TO ACHIEVE EVEN A TENTATIVE RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE BEST TACTIC MAY BE TO SUMMARIZE PRECISELY THE STATE OF THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE ON THIS ISSUE AND THEN MOVE ON TO CONSIDER OTHER NEGOTIATING TOPICS, RETURNING AT A LATER STAGE TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST ROUND OF REDUCTIONS.

I. COMMON CEILING

4. DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. A LOGICAL NEXT SUBJECT TO TACKLE IS VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE COMMON CEILING. THE ALLIES IN VIENNA HAVE ALREADY TAKEN THE FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION BY SENDING THE NAC THE RECOMMENDATIONS ON ADJUSTING THE PRESENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND HAVE SIGNED THEIR READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC WITH THE EAST IN THE AUTUMN. THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR DISCUSSING THIS TOPIC IS A POSITIVE DECISION BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES AND THEN BY NAC ON HOW TO ADJUST THIS DEFINITION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF EASTERN COMPLAINTS THAT THE ALLIES HAVE INCLUDED POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN THE ALLIED TOTAL OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES WITHOUT INCLUDING COMPARABLE WESTERN EUROPEAN PERSONNEL IN THE ALLIED TOTAL OF NATO GROUND FORCES.

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5. WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN OUR REASONS IN MBFR VIENNA 0054 AND 0055 FOR STRONGLY PREFERRING THE COURSE DESCRIBED AS CASE 1, NAMELY, THE ADJUSTMENT OF WP GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS BY DELETING THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND POLISH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE GROUND ELEMENT PERSONNEL AND ADDING WP GROUND-SUPPORT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL. A WASHINGTON DECISION ON THIS MATTER SHOULD BE TAKEN BY MID-AUGUST IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT A NAC DECISION

IN EARLY SEPTEMBER.

6. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD INDICATE THAT THEIR READINESS TO MAKE SUCH A MOVE DEPENDS ON SOVIET AGREEMENT TO FOCUS REDUCTIONS ON GROUND FORCES. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS CONDITION AND IN THE EVENT THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS SUBSEQUENTLY INCLUDED, THE EAST MIGHT THEN ARGUE THAT THE ALLIES HAD OFFERED UNCONDITIONALLY TO EXCLUDE THESE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK FORCE ELEMENTS FROM THE REDUCTION BASE.

7. IF THE EAST SHOWS READINESS TO MOVE TOWARD A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES ON OUR MODEL, THE ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RECTIFY THE ONLY INCONSISTENCY FROM THE UNIFORM PRINCIPLE WHICH WOULD THEN REMAIN -- FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL. (THIS PROBLEM IS FURTHER DESCRIBED IN MBFR VIENNA 0054-0055). WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES DECIDE BY SEPTEMBER 1 TO AUTHORIZE INCLUSION OF FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL UNDER THE HEADING OF GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO BE PREPARED TO SEEK ALLIED CONCURRENCE IF THE EASTERN RESPONSE IS SUCH THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH THIS STEP.

8. TEN PERCENT ALLIED REDUCTION VS. RETENTION OF

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700,000 MAN COMMON CEILING. IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT PREOCCUPATION OF THE SPC AND MBFR WG WITH THIS ISSUE (SEE USNATO 4011 AND 4036), AND PRESENT UK INSISTENCE ON ANALYZING AND RESOLVING THIS ISSUE BEFORE SETTling ON AN ALLIED APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, WASHINGTON WILL DOUBTLESS SOON BE ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE CURRENTLY STATED ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOAL SHOULD BE RE-STATED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REVISED NATO DATA ON NATO FORCES. US DELEGATION'S PREFERENCE FOR RETAINING THE COMMON CEILING AT 700,000 MEN EXPRESSED IN MBFR VIENNA 0144, IS STILL STRONGLY HELD. WHILE FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES, A USG DECISION ON THIS QUESTION BY SEPTEMBER WOULD PROBABLY SUFFICE, DEVELOPMENTS IN BRUSSELS WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE A NEED FOR AN EARLIER DECISION.

9. DIVULGING CHANGES IN NATO GROUND FORCE TOTALS.

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DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE REVISIONS IN THE ALLIED GROUND FORCE DEFINITION WILL PROVIDE A SUITABLE OCCASION FOR MENTIONING TO THE EAST REVISIONS IN NATO ESTIMATES OF TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCES AND OF TOTAL WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES. THE EAST HAS ALREADY CONTESTED THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED TOTALS. IT PROBABLY WILL LEARN IN DUE COURSE OF THE REVISIONS IN THE ALLIED FIGURES IF IT HAS NOT DONE SO ALREADY. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO PUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS FOR ADJUSTING THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES IF THE SOVIETS ARE LEFT WITH THE ASSUMPTION THAT THESE CHANGES ARE BASED ON THE ORIGINAL ALLIED TOTALS. THE ALLIES IN VIENNA WILL DEVELOP A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE REASONS FOR THE CHANGE. THE AD HOC GROUP HAS PROPOSED THIS COURSE TO NATO (PARAS 10-12, PART II OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT (MBFR VIENNA 0199). WE REQUEST WASHINGTON DECISION ON THIS ISSUE BY MID-AUGUST TO ENABLE NATO ACTION BY 1 OCTOBER.

10. PROVIDING ALLIED DATA ON OVERALL AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE REVISED ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WILL BE TO INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS. WE WOULD INTEND TO ARGUE IN RESPONSE THAT THE

UNADJUSTED AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES IS ROUGHLY EQUAL, THUS HIGHLIGHTING THE PROBLEM OF DISPARITY OF GROUND FORCES AS THE MAIN TOPIC WHICH SHOULD BE TACKLED BY REDUCTIONS. TO MAKE THIS POINT CONVINCINGLY, THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DIVULGE TO THE EAST OVERALL NATO FIGURES FOR THE TOTAL AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE. THE AD HOC GROUP HAS RECOMMENDED THIS ACTION TO NATO (PARA 8 OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT). A DECISION TO PERMIT THIS STEP FROM WASHINGTON AGENCIES IS NEEDED BY MID-AUGUST AND FOLLOW-ON ACTION IN NATO SHOULD BE TAKEN BY MID-SEPTEMBER.

11. COMPARING NATIONAL TOTALS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

THE LIKELY EASTERN RESPONSE TO WESTERN STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ROUGH COMPARABILITY OF TOTAL AIR FORCE MANPOWER
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ON EACH SIDE WILL BE TO CHALLENGE THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED FIGURES. FOR THIS REASON, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO OFFER TO EXCHANGE WITH THE EAST ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS A BREAKDOWN OF THE ALLIED TOTALS FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BASIS. THE REASONS WHY THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF THE EAST WERE TO ACCEPT IT ARE: AGREED TOTALS WOULD MEAN THAT THE EAST ITSELF HAD ATTENDED THE EXISTENCE OF THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES; AGREED TOTALS WOULD PROVIDE AN AGREED BASIS FOR COMPUTING REDUCTIONS; COMPARISON OF THE DATA MAY REVEAL FURTHER PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND CLARIFICATION AND THUS COULD RESULT IN AN AGREED ADJUSTMENT OF TOTALS.

12. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY TOTALS ARE ON A LEVEL OF SUCH GENERALITY THAT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO PROVIDE THE EAST VALUABLE INFORMATION. IN ANY CASE, ANY INFORMATION THE EAST DID RECEIVE WOULD BE MORE THAN COUNTERBALANCED BY EASTERN FIGURES OBTAINED IN RETURN. SOME NATO ALLIES MAY OBJECT TO GIVING NATIONAL TOTALS OWING TO HYPER-SENSITIVITY TO THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS. HOWEVER, SOME LOGICAL BREAKDOWN OF TOTALS IS ESSENTIAL AS A BASIS FOR COMPARISON OF DATA AND SPECIFIC AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY TOTALS ARE THE MOST LOGICAL AND EASIEST TO HANDLE WAY OF COMPARING DATA AND ARRIVING AT AGREED TOTALS. THE ALTERNATIVE OF COMPARING TOTALS ON THE BASIS OF AGGREGATIVE FUNCTIONAL UNITS, SUCH AS INFANTRY BATTALIONS OR SIGNAL COMPANIES, WOULD BREAK DOWN OF ITS OWN COMPLEXITY. RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ON A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BASIS, IF

KEPT IN A DATA CONTEXT, WOULD NOT OF ITSELF ESTABLISH
THE BASIS FOR ANY NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS. THE ALLIES
COULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THEY HAD CHOSEN THIS
METHOD OF COMPARISON FOR REASONS OF CONVENIENCE AND
DID NOT INTEND TO PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION AGAINST
NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS.

13. THE EAST IS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO THIS DATA EXCHANGE,
INTER ALIA, BECAUSE IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE DISPARITY
IN GROUND FORCES IN AN AUTHORITATIVE WAY. NONETHELESS,
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IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE THIS PROPOSAL.
THE DATA FIELD IS ONE OF THE FEW AREAS WHERE THE
ALLIES HAVE A "MORAL" ADVANTAGE OVER THE EAST IN
THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DO SOMETHING THAT THE EAST
HAS NOT.

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FROM US REP MBFR

14. THE AD HOC GROUP HAS RECOMMENDED THIS STEP TO NATO (PARA 14 OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT). WE REQUEST AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON AGENCIES TO MAKE THIS PROPOSAL TO THE EAST. AUTHORITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER AND CORRESPONDING NATO ACTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE BY THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.

15. NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER. IT IS IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO PREVENT SOVIET CIRCUMVENTION OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT THROUGH INCREASES IN SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. AN INCREASE IN BONA FIDE SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA WOULD OF COURSE IN ITSELF UNDERMINE AN MBFR AGREEMENT TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES. IT COULD IN ADDITION SERVE AS A COVER FOR INCREASING GROUND FORCE STRENGTH IN THE AREA. THIS MEANS THAT PHASE I AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN SOME MEASURES BLOCKING THIS POSSIBILITY. IT

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IS CLEAR THT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR INTEREST WITH REGARD TO US FORCES. HENCE, WE EXPECT THAT ANY MBFR AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN SOME LIMITATION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES. IF THIS IS SO, THE WEST OUGHT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THE FALL SESSION ON THIS ISSUE IN ORDER TO TRY TO OBTAIN SOMETHING FROM THE EAST IN THE NEGOTIATING CONTEXT FOR ITS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THIS ACTION.

16. WHILE A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION COULD BE CONSIDERED TO APPLY TO THIS CASE AND TO BLOCK INCREASES IN THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF EITHER SIDE, IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION WILL BE FOUND BY AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES TO BE INSUFFICIENTLY EXPLICIT AS REGARDS THIS POSSIBILITY. WE BELIEVE THE SIMPLEST AND MOST DIRECT PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO ACCEPT A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WITH REGARD TO OVERALL AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA IN CONNECTION WITH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THIS COMMITMENT SHOULD BE LIMITED IN DURATION FOR PARTIES OTHER THAN THE US AND SOVIET UNION.

17. THE AD HOC GROUP HAS RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH NATO (PARA 15 OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT). WE RECOMMEND A POSITIVE US DECISION ON A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER BY MID-SEPTEMBER TO PERMIT A NATO DECISION BY MID-OCTOBER.

18. INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE COMMON CEILING. EVEN THOUGH THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES MAY CHALLENGE THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED FIGURES ON AIR FORCE TOTALS, THEY APPEAR COMMITTED TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS, PERHPAPS BELIEVING THAT THEY CAN IN THAT WAY ACHIEVE REDUCTIONS OF AIRCRAFT. FROM THE ALLIED VIEWPOINT, IT COULD PROVE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER LIMITED REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IF, BY SO DOING, THE ALLIES COULD ADVANCE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND MORE EFFECTIVELY MOVE TOWARD REDUCTING THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. A COMMON CEILING COVERING ALL MANPOWER IN THE AREA WOULD BE A MORE RATIONAL

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CONCEPT THAN A COMMON CEILING COVERING ONLY GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. HOWEVER, IT COULD, AS COMPARED TO THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION OF NOT INCLUDING AIR FORCE MANPOWER, BE SEEN AS SOMEWHAT PREJUDICAIL TO THE ALLIED POSITION NOT TO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT IN REDUCTIONS, AND MAY FOR THAT REASON BE CONTENTIOUS FOR SOME.

19. ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE DEPENDENT ON AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: (A) ULTIMATE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT; (B) EASTERN AGREEMENT TO TAKE AT LEAST 90 PERCENT OF AGREED REDUCTIONS IN EACH PHASE IN GROUND FORCES; AND (C) EASTERN AGREEMENT TO MAINTAIN, AFTER REDUCTIONS ARE COMPLETED, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.

20. ADOPTION OF THIS PROPOSAL WOLD HAVE THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE THAT SOME US AND SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO REVISE THEIR COMMON CEILING TARGET FIGURE TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER. HOWEVER, THIS PROPOSAL IS OF ITSELF UNLIKELY TO SCORE A DECISIVE BREAKTHROUGH TOWARDS EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING.

21. THE AD HOC GROUP HAS REQUESTED THAT NATO STUDY THIS QUESTION (PARA 16 OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT). WE REQUEST THAT A USG DECISION TO COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER UNDER A COMMON CEILING BE REACHED BY SEPTEMBER IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN ALLIED DECISION BY OCTOBER 1.

22. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY THE US TO PARTICIPATE

IN PHASE II. US PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II WILL BE AN
ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN
PHASE II. MOREOVER, US PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II WILL
PROBABLY BE NECESSARY IN ANY CASE TO MEET CONGRESSIONAL
EXPECTATIONS FOR THE SIZE OF US WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE.
A DECISION ON THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REACHED BY WASHINGTON
AGENCIES BY THE FIRST OF SEPTEMBER AND COMMUNICATED TO
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THE ALLIES. ALLIES IN VIENNA SHOULD ALSO BE AUTHORIZED
BY OCTOBER 1 TO COMMUNICATE IT TO THE EAST AT AN APPROPRIATE TACTICAL
POINT.

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ACTION SS-30

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EXDIS

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FROM US REP MBFR

23. STATEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SOME US
REDUCTIONS IN UNITS. WE REQUEST AUTHORITY

TO TELL THE EAST DURING THE FALL ROUND OF THE TALKS THAT "A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF US PHASE I REDUCTIONS UNDER THE ALLIED PROPOSAL WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF UNITS." WE WOULD NOT INTEND TO GO FURTHER INTO DETAILS ON THIS SUBJECT AT THAT TIME. WASHINGTON AUTHORITY TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT IS REQUESTED BY SEPTEMBER 15.

II. NUCLEAR SIGNAL

24. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED IN MESSAGE #6 OF THIS SERIES THAT THE ALLIES BE IN A POSITION BY MID-OCTOBER TO INDICATE THAT IF THE EAST IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET MEN AND TANKS, THE ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED
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TO INCLUDE SOME US NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS. US DECISION ON THIS NEEDED IN EARLY AUGUST AND AN ALLIED DECISION AT NATO BY THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. IN ORDER TO GAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT TO MAKE THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR WASHINGTON TO GIVE THE ALLIES ITS PREFERRED CONCEPT ON THE TACTICAL USE TO BE MADE OF THE CONTENT OF OPTION 3. HENCE, A WASHINGTON DECISION ON A GENERAL TACTICAL CONCEPT SHOULD BE REACHED BY THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER.

III. ASSOCIATED MEASURES

25. WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THE EAST WILL BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY OVER ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHILE THE SHAPE OF FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS REMAINS FAR FROM AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE DELEGATION CONSIDERS THAT THE ALLIED POSITION SHOULD BE FLESHED OUT DURING THE NEXT ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH MEANS THAT WASHINGTON AND SUBSEQUENT NAC DECISIONS WILL BE REQUIRED. THE ASSOCIATED MEASURES THE ALLIES HAVE IN MIND WILL HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON THE DAILY ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET MILITARY, AND CONSEQUENTLY THERE APPEARS TO BE NO PROSPECT THAT THE EAST COULD ACCEPT THEM WITHOUT A THOROUGH STUDY BY THE SOVIET MILITARY BUREAUCRACY OF THEIR IMPLICATIONS. THIS MEANS THAT ALLIED PROPOSALS MUST BE SET OUT IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AT A MINIMUM OF TWO TO THREE MONTHS BEFORE ANY SERIOUS EASTERN REACTION IS EXPECTED. OUR SCENARIO OF TANGIBLE RESULTS IN MBFR BY SPRING 1975 THEREFORE REQUIRES THAT ALLIED POSITIONS ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS BE PRESENTED IN PLENARY SESSIONS BEFORE THE END OF 1974.

THIS WOULD REQUIRE US DECISIONS BY OCTOBER AND NATO
DECISIONS BY NOVEMBER ON:

A. VERIFICATION: THE PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION WHICH
THE ALLIES WOULD WISH TO ACCOMPANY FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS
ALONG THE LINES OF THE ALLIED PROPOSALS.

B. MANPOWER CEILINGS, EXCEPTIONS, AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION:
CONCEPTUAL LANGUAGE AND A CLEAR PHILOSOPHY SO THAT THE ALLIES CAN
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PRESENT A COMMON FRONT IN THE FACE OF EASTERN QUESTIONS.

C. STABILIZING MEASURES: SPECIFIC MEASURES ON
LIMITATIONS OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO
THE AREA, AND EXCEPTIONS TO CEILINGS FOR PURPOSES OF
ROTATION AND EXERCISES. THIS SUBJECT IS ALSO COVERED
IN PART II, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT.RESOR

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